A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-021-00536-7.

Zawiera wybór pism Jana Amosa Komeńskiego.

I. Logica. Philosophia naturalis.--II. Metaphysica. Ethica.

I. Logica. Philosophia naturalis.--II. Metaphysica. Ethica.

Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...) voices is ambiguous between different readings, and that lack of disambiguation in this regard has led to flaws in assessment tools, diagnostic debates and empirical studies. Such flaws, we argue furthermore, are often linked to misreadings of inner/outer-terminology in relevant 19th and early twentieth century work on AVHs, in particular, in connection with Kandinsky’s and Jaspers’s distinction between hallucinations and pseudo-hallucinations. (shrink)

A new axiomatic treatment of equilibrium thermodynamics—thermostatics—is presented. The equilibrium states of a thermal system are assumed to be represented by a differentiable manifold of dimensionn + 1 (n finite). The empirical temperature is defined by the notion of thermal equilibrium. Empirical entropy is shown to exist for all systems with the property that the total work delivered along closed adiabats is zero. Absolute entropy and temperature follow from the additivity of heat and energy for two separate systems in thermal (...) equilibrium considered as a whole. The absolute temperature is defined up to a multiplicative constant. The exterior differentiable calculus of Cartan is introduced and in a subsequent paper its use for the derivation of standard results in thermostatics will be explained. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.2 (2002) 256-257 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate" Johannes Brachtendorf. Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate." Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000. Pp. viii + 335. Cloth, DM 128,00. "The Trinity" is arguably Augustine's (philosophically) most demanding work. Yet it is (...) precisely its philosophical quality that is nowadays sometimes called in question for its apparent lack of argumentative coherence. H. I. Marrou has even expressed the view that this may have been intended, as the text is designed as an exercitatioanimi, a spiritual-mental exercise; i.e., the argumentative gaps are deliberately left open to be filled in by whoever undergoes the exercise. This would mean that "The Trinity" lacks any philosophical or theological position or doctrine in particular, and that it must not be judged by the standards of philosophical discourse, even those of Augustine's own day and age. Brachtendorf sets out with a revision of that view. Augustine, he argues, does indeed formulate a particular position. The impression that there may be gaps in his arguments could well stem from a misunderstanding of some of them. Augustine, Brachtendorf reports in his first chapter (1), developed his teaching of the triune God in close contact with the philosophy of Plotinus. However, he distanced himself from Plotinus by analyzing the process of cognition not by taking as an example the divine nous, but the menshumana. Apart from that he developed an ontology of the Trinity (2) and only then analyzed the human mind in analogy to it (3-4). He also looked into the relationship of mind and language ("word") (5) and developed further some aspects of this relationship such as the trinitarian structure of the human mind (6), the relationship of knowledge and wisdom (7), the human mind as the image of God (8), the self-reflection of the human mind (9), language as an expression of that self-reflection in the image of God (10), and the concept of the "inner word" (11).Brachtendorf concludes with an appeal not to read into Augustine's link of notitia and amor that he was interested in the analysis of self-knowledge merely for ethical reasons. Amor, he argues, expressly includes operations of the intellect. Augustine's interest was therefore genuinely theoretical and intellectualist. Amor, for Augustine, was a force that creates knowledge as such, no matter what the content. Its impact is practical and theoretical. Referring to the works of Charles Taylor, Martin Heidegger, Max Scheler, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Hannah Arendt, Brachtendorf demonstrates how influential Augustine was with this aspect of his thought in the development of "Subjekt"-centered philosophies in the twentieth century. Yet, as influential as this approach may have been in this particular field, arguing, as it did, for the ontological character of human subjectivity (i.e., that the human mind was naturally structured in a trinitarian way, but had to make its natural intelligence explicit in thought through the learning of language) it did not revolutionize [End Page 256] the understanding of language. In consequence it did not impress the philosophers of the linguistic turn, and that is probably why today the argument of "The Trinity" is so often found wanting.Pointing back to the source Brachtendorf's study is a welcome contribution to the subject and a useful guide for all who now--hopefully, and encouraged by this work--set out for themselves to have a (closer) look at the original. Josef Lössl Catholic University Leuven... (shrink)

The question ‘What is death?’ is by no means exclusively or primarily a question of medical science. It is, in the last analysis, a philosophical question. The philosopher’s role in the discussion of death is twofold: On the one hand, he has to explore those highly intelligible and essentially necessary aspects of death which no other human science investigates. This task includes a phenomenology of life and death, an ontology and metaphysics, as well as a philosophical anthropology of death. It (...) likewise includes an analysis of the language of death and life and of the logical structure of the arguments used in the debates about life and death. On the other hand the philosopher has to warn representatives of other disciplines against concluding too much from the little they know and extending their methods to areas where they are not appropriate. Careful reflection on both philosophical knowledge and philosophical ignorance concerning death shows, I shall argue, that the definition of death in terms of ‘brain death’ ought to be rejected. (shrink)

Viennese Brain Research and the Formation of Austrian Positivism. In this paper, I want to argue that the Vienna School of Medicine and especially the Viennese Brain Anatomy had an impact on the formation of the Austrian positivism. I argue that Carl von Rokitansky's (1804–1878) doctrine that psychological phenomena must be translated into anatomical facts and Theodor Meynert's (1833–1892) theory of brain functions served as one basis for the formation of the Austrian positivism. In this sense, two of the main (...) early positivistic thinkers, Ernst Mach (1838–1916) and Richard Wahle (1857–1935), used Meynert's brain theory to argue for a bundle view of the Self. Friedrich Jodl (1849–1914) also thought about his theory, and even Moritz Schlick (1882–1936) who demanded a ‘reduction of the psychology to the brain physiology’ grappled with this approach. Meynert, a scholar of Rokitansky, the founder of the Vienna School of Medicine, was a leading figure in the history of neurology and has made several significant contributions to this discipline. He argues that the Self does not exist from an anatomical point of view. As Richard Wahle tells us, Meynert's theory of the brain functions was widely accepted under the brain researchers by the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. He makes clear that brain researchers did in common refer to Meynert's theory to explain psychical functions as brain functions. He says from their point of view there was no doubt about it. Mach talks about Meynert's theory in Erkenntnis und Irrtum. There he says that Meynert's brain theory explains the nature and conditions of the consciousness. Michael Hagner argues that Mach's “Das Ich ist unrettbar” is hardly imaginable without the cerebral embedding of the mental functions. (shrink)

We translate Socrates’ famous saying I know that I know nothing into the arithmetical sentence I prove that I prove nothing. Then it is easy to show that this translated saying is formally undecidable in formal arithmetic, using Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem. We investigate some variations of this Socrates-Gödel sentence. In an appendix we sketch a ramified epistemic logic with propositional quantifiers in order to analyze the Socrates-Gödel sentence in a more logical way, separated from the arithmetical context.

The Art of a Democracy of Emotions There is a long discussion in philosophy about the relationship between reason, emotions and politics. Today the adequate question is not whether, but to what extent and in which sense emotions normatively have to play a role in democracy. My first thesis is that there are three central answers to that question which can be brought down to the nominators ‘presentation’, ‘compensation’ and ‘transformation’. Within a political context, emotions ask for a contemporary form (...) of presentation, for a tempering or balancing compensation, and for a meaningful transformation. And my second thesis is that this threefold reaction can be achieved either with the aid of, or even in an excellent way by, aesthetic experiences. In detail I focus on a brief analysis of the modern political meaning of impertinence; the current situation concerning the philosophical discussion on democracy, emotions and aesthetics (with an accent on Martha Nussbaum); and finally on my own suggestion, supported by I. Kant and J. Dewey, concerning the concept of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

Lemovo dílo Dokonalá prázdnota je sbírkou recenzí fiktivních autorů na neexistující vědecké práce. Patří sem i přednáška Alfreda Testy proslovená u příležitosti udělení Nobelovy ceny za fyziku. Je to vlastně rekapitulace kosmologického konceptu postaveného na objevu pozapomenuté myšlenky Aristida Acheropoula, která má vysvětlit silentium universi. Proč vesmír mlčí? Proč nám nikdo neodpovídá na naše výzvy posílané do mezihvězdných dálek? Proč je naše pátrání po mimozemských civilizacích neúspěšné? Testa ve své přednášce před posluchače postupně vrství fundamentální otázky vztahu matematiky a fyziky, (...) intertpretaci posledních objevů moderní kosmologie, vysvětlení fyzikálních zákonitostí teorie relativity a kvantové mechaniky včetně metafyzické otázky proč jsou právě takové. Protože Lem staví před čtenáře příběh vědeckého objevu, nabízí se možnost, vzít je zcela vážně nikoli jako fiction, ale jako science a podívat se na jeho jednotlivé komponenty očima soudobé vědy. (shrink)

The book represents a historical overview of the way the topic of gesture and sign language has been treated in the 18th century French philosophy. The texts treated are grouped into several categories based on the view they present of deafness and gesture. While some of those texts obviously view deafness and sign language in negative terms, i.e. as deficiency, others present deafness essentially as difference, i.e. as a set of competences that might provide some insights into how spoken language (...) works. One of the arguments of the book is that these two views of deafness and sign language still represent two dominant paradigms present in the current debates on the issue. The aim of the book, therefore, is not only to provide a historical overview but to trace what might be called a "history of the present". (shrink)

Let X be an infinite internal set in an ω1-saturated nonstandard universe. Then for any coloring of [X] k , such that the equivalence E of having the same color is countably determined and there is no infinite internal subset of [X] k with all its elements of different colors (i.e., E is condensating on X), there exists an infinite internal set Z⊆X such that all the sets in [Z] k have the same color. This Ramsey-type result is obtained as (...) a consequence of a more general one, asserting the existence of infinite internal Q-homogeneous sets for certain Q ⊆ [[X] k ] m , with arbitrary standard k≥ 1, m≥ 2. In the course of the proof certain minimal condensating countably determined sets will be described. (shrink)

Contemporary epistemology seems almost exclusively focused on questions concerning knowledge and justification. Such a focus has had two broad consequences. First, epistemologists have neglected other equally important concepts. Specifically, the concept of understanding is absent in most discussions. Secondly, discussions have avoided the role of the will in the agents to whom we attribute knowledge and justification. Surprisingly, virtue epistemology also suffers from this narrow view. Specifically, virtue epistemologists of all kinds have neglected these two important aspects of our epistemic (...) lives. I examine the spectrum of virtue theories in epistemology, and locate a gap between the two sides—responsibilism and reliabilism. This gap, I suggest, might be bridged if we take seriously (i) the idea that there are other epistemic goals apart from knowledge and justification (e.g., understanding), and (ii) that cognition requires the whole person—intellect and will—and not simply the intellect in isolation from other faculties. (shrink)

This essay develops Slavoj Žižek’s critique of Quentin Meillassoux’s speculative materialism. The first part consists of a discussion of Meillassoux’s ‘principle of factiality’ (which states that only contingency is necessary) and Ray Brassier’s problematization of this principle’s self-referentiality. The second part takes up Žižek’s critique of Meillassoux, which solves the problem of self-reference by dialecticizing the principle of factiality, ending up with the thesis of the contingency of necessity. The third part is an elaboration of Žižek’s critique in which the (...) main lacuna in Meillassoux’s philosophy, i.e. the lack of any account of the genesis of subjectivity, is seen to lead to a disavowal of ‘constitutive mythology’ as theorized by Markus Gabriel. It is argued that Meillassoux’s notion of ‘hyper-Chaos’ is in fact the core of his mythology, which becomes especially clear when contrasted with an alternative mythology, namely Henri Bergson’s vision of ‘creative evolution’. Finally, it is shown how Žižek’s critique of Meillassoux gravitates toward this mythology of creative evolution as his Lacanian version of dialectical materialism is reformulated in the light of the speculative realist problematic. (shrink)

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, abstract art has formed a central stream of modern art. To attain purely aesthetic goals, many avant-garde artists turned painting in particular into a pursuit of breaking off the relations with natural forms. Instead of copying them, they have merely relied on their inner visions. When externalizing these visions directly on the canvas or sheets of paper, the practitioners of abstract art have inadvertently used the phenomenological method and its epoché. In this essay (...) I argue that the philosophies of Kupka and Husserl are largely compatible. This is not because the two use the same terminology, but because they virtually mean and do the same thing in their respective fields. Even where there are significant differences between them, these are not as great as it might at first seem. In the essay’s conclusion I sum up some of the most significant implications their compatible theories have for the philosophy of art and for various theories of art today. (shrink)

At the beginning there was an act of extraordinary generosity: when I first met Jeff at a legal semiotics conference in the early eighties, he approached me after my presentation of mostly half-baked ideas and wild conjectures, congratulating me on my visual displays, and enquiring if I should be interested in developing my work into a joint book project. In the portrait of the scholar as a young man or woman, this is the kind of turn of events I should (...) hope will happen for all my colleagues in the first, still insecure phases of their careers. I have had the honour and privilege of becoming a member of the Collegium Invisibile Semioticae with Jeff as the Decanus subtilis of this enterprise, special in many ways. In the abstract of my contribution to his festschrift colloquium I remarked that “The idea of the academy has to be recreated from nothing. Ex nihilo quodlibet: ad multos annos” — hoping for many more than the seven years that were to follow. In the following seven Paninian quodlibeta I have endeavoured to come to terms with the intellectual and existential appeal of economy and minimalism: fail, fail again, fail better. (shrink)

Individualism and collectivism serve in the field of sociological theories as complementary principles of the formation of concepts and hypotheses. This paper attempts to show that the methodological forms of i. and c., as distinguished from the more ideological traditional forms, may be differentiated, according to whether they are intended as ontological, meaning-theoretical or explanation-theoretical, as well as according to whether they are presented in a more dogmatic or more qualified form. Out of the combination of these various aspects arises (...) a multiplicity of positions dissolving the traditionally accepted opposition between individualism and collectivism. (shrink)

Hildebrand oftentimes said that his disciples—even when they believed they were deeply indebted to him for knowledge, wisdom, and truth—had a duty to criticize and overcome any error they would find in his philosophy, because the sole purpose of his writings was to state the truth. He himself gave some extraordinary examples of self-critique. In the following, I wish to treat such an example: a significant error about the nature of the free volitional response, which Stephen Schwarz was the first (...) to note and which Hildebrand himself later explicitly revoked. Furthermore, I wish to show that Hildebrand’s rejecting this error makes his ethics as a whole much more consistent, and opens the way to bringing his philosophy of love closer to our experience. (shrink)

A method is presented for deciding whether correct predictions about other people are based on simulation or theory use. The differentiating power of this method was assessed with cognitive estimation biases (e.g. estimating the area of Brazil) in two variations. Experiments 1 and 2 operated with the influence of response scales of different length. Experiment 3 used the difference between free estimates that tended to be far off the true value and estimates constrained by an appropriate response scale, where estimates (...) became greatly more realistic. The critical question is how well observer subjects can predict these target biases under two different presentation conditions. Response scale biases (Experiments 1 and 2) were more strongly predicted when observer subjects were presented with the two scales juxtaposed, than when responses for each scale were given independently. This speaks for the use of a theory, since simulation should, if there is any difference at all, be made more difficult by the juxtaposition of conditions. The difference between free and constrained estimations (Experiment 3) was more strongly predicted under independent than under juxtaposed presentation. This speaks for the use of simulation since use of a theory should, if anything, be helped by juxtaposition of problems since it helps highlight the theoretically relevant factor. Results are discussed in view of recent proposals about when simulation is likely to be used, i.e. for belief fixation but not action prediction (Stich and Nichols, 1995b), for content fixation (Heal, 1996a), and for rational effects only (Heal, 1996b). (shrink)

This paper argues first that, contrary to what one would expect, metaphorical interpretations of utterances pass two of Cappelan and Lepore's Minimalist tests for semantic context-sensitivity. I then propose how, in light of that result, one might analyze metaphors on the model of indexicals and demonstratives, expressions that (even) Minimalists agree are semantically context-dependent. This analysis builds on David Kaplan's semantics for demonstratives and refines an earlier proposal in (Stern, Metaphor in context, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2000). In the course of (...) this argument, I also discuss some new examples of linguistic phenomena that motivate a semantic structure underlying metaphorical interpretation, phenomena I argue that neither Minimalists nor Contextualists can explain. (shrink)